Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Public disclosure before a fix exists puts every user at risk.

Report it privately to mario@legioncodeinc.com. Include:

• What the vulnerability is and the impact you think it has
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept
• Affected version, commit, or component (daemon, CLI, MCP server, a specific harness, embeddings)
• Any suggested fix if you have one

You'll get an acknowledgment within 3 business days. We'll confirm the issue, work a fix, and keep you posted on progress.

We follow coordinated disclosure. Once a fix is ready and released, we'll credit you for the report unless you'd rather stay anonymous. Please give us a reasonable window to ship the fix before you disclose publicly.

Honeycomb is pre-release. Security fixes land on the latest main and the most recent release only. There is no back-porting to older versions until the project hits a stable line.

In scope: the daemon, the honeycomb CLI, the MCP server, the harness clients, the embeddings daemon, and the SDK in this repository.

Out of scope: vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report those upstream), and anything requiring a compromised host or physical access to the machine. The daemon binds loopback only by design, so report any path that exposes it beyond the local machine.

The installer site at get.theapiary.sh serves scripts that users pipe directly into sh or iex. To prevent unauthorized deployments of malicious installer bytes, the deployment workflow (.github/workflows/deploy-install-site.yaml) implements defense-in-depth:

1. Protected environment: The deploy job requires the production environment, which MUST be configured with required reviewers. Repository administrators must configure this at Settings → Environments → production with at least one trusted maintainer as a required reviewer. Without required reviewers, the workflow still references production, but deployments will not pause for human approval.

2. Branch ancestry verification: The workflow verifies that any triggering v* tag is reachable from the protected main branch. This ensures the tag's commit has passed through main's required PR reviews and CI quality gates (defined in .github/rulesets/main-protection.json). Tags pointing to arbitrary commits not on main are rejected before any build or deploy occurs.

3. Manual approval: Even if a tag passes the ancestry check, the protected environment requires a human reviewer to approve the deployment before it proceeds to Cloudflare Pages.

These controls ensure that only vetted, reviewed code can reach the public installer endpoint. Do not remove the environment protection or weaken the branch ancestry check without a documented security review.