fix(wallet): harden asset-lock recovery — invisible chain-locked rows, two unbounded waits - #4422
fix(wallet): harden asset-lock recovery — invisible chain-locked rows, two unbounded waits#4422bfoss765 wants to merge 3 commits into
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Chain-locked enrichment promotes tracked asset locks to
`AssetLockStatus::RecoveredFromChain` (discriminant 5) in
`sync/reconstruction.rs`, but every host resume surface expressed
"still recoverable" as the contiguous range `1..3`. Status 5 sits
above the terminal `Consumed` (4) numerically while being decidedly
non-terminal, so each of those filters silently dropped exactly the
rows the restore scan had just rebuilt.
User-visible effect: an address top-up that was funded and chain-locked
before a wallet restore appears on no surface at all — not the Pending
Platform Top Ups list, not the Resumable Registrations list — and the
Swift status label rendered it as "Unknown(5)". The funds are intact
and Rust will happily resume them, but nothing in the UI can reach
them, so they read as lost.
Changes:
- `AssetLockDao.observeResumableAddressTopUps` admits `1..3 ∪ {5}`.
`4` stays excluded: it is the terminal tombstone that
`resume_asset_lock` rejects, and re-surfacing it would produce the
perpetual-spinner row the #4347 guard exists to prevent.
- New `AssetLockDao.observeResumableTopUpsByFundingType`. Shielded
address top-ups (funding type 5) previously had no resumable query
at all — the address query is pinned to funding type 4, and the
identity-recovery surface behind `TrackedAssetLock.eligibleFromNative`
deliberately admits only funding types 0..2 — so a stalled shielded
top-up was invisible everywhere.
- Swift `isVisibleAsResumable` / `canFundIdentity` accept 5, and
`statusLabel` names it. A `5` carries a real `ChainAssetLockProof`,
so it is as fundable as a `3`; what is unknown is Platform-side
consumption, and Platform is the arbiter of that.
- `IdentitiesContentView.crossWalletResumableLocks` now reuses
`isVisibleAsResumable` instead of restating the range inline.
`TrackedAssetLock.FundingType` is deliberately NOT widened to funding
types 4/5. That enum is the identity-recovery eligibility filter, and
its consumers assert on it (`IdentityRegistration` requires
IDENTITY_REGISTRATION, `IdentityCredits` requires the two top-up
variants). Admitting address/shielded locks there would push them into
pickers whose `require(...)` then throws — a new crash path, not a fix.
The address/shielded recovery surface is the DAO query above.
Tests: 7 new Robolectric Room tests pinning both ends of the domain
(5 in, 4 out, 0 out, funding-type and wallet scoping intact), plus a
Swift case asserting status 5 is resumable.
…t thread Two unbounded waits on the asset-lock recovery path could never terminate, and both are reached from FFI entry points that drive the future with `runtime().block_on(...)` — so neither merely delays a result, each pins the calling host thread for good. 1. Already-consumed reconciliation (#4357 regression) `reconcile_asset_lock_submit_result` upgrades an Instant proof via `upgrade_to_chain_lock_proof(out_point, chain_lock_timeout)`, and all three production call sites (`identity/network/registration.rs` x2, `platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rs`) pass `None`. The `None` arm of `wait_for_chain_lock` loops forever waiting on SPV lock events. The trigger is routine rather than exotic: an IS-locked lock consumed seconds after broadcast draws the unauthenticated "already consumed" report while its ChainLock is still ~2.5 minutes out — and never arrives at all when the device is offline or SPV is not connected. Pre-#4357 this path returned a typed error immediately. `None` now selects `RECONCILIATION_CHAIN_LOCK_TIMEOUT` (180s). The ChainLock here is wanted only as evidence to record alongside a report about an operation that has ALREADY terminated, so failing to get it degrades instead of propagating: the lock keeps its current status and the typed `AssetLockAlreadyConsumed` is still returned, preserving the code-24 signal hosts branch on. #4357's proof retention is unchanged whenever the ChainLock is reachable inside the bound. 2. Resume after an ambiguous re-broadcast (#4367 regression) A `MaybeSent` verdict on a `Built` lock advances it to `Broadcast` and waits for a proof. But `MaybeSent` is also the NORMAL verdict for a genuinely rejected transaction — `DapiBroadcaster` classifies every failure that way by construction, and the SPV broadcaster reaches `Rejected` only on `NotConnected` (no BIP61 in modern Dash). So the advance is not evidence the transaction is live, and the following `wait_for_proof(None)` at the `resume_asset_lock(.., None)` call sites turned a ~30s broadcast failure into a wait that never ends, because no proof can arrive for a transaction that was never accepted. The advance is kept (it is what stops each recovery pass repeating the same broadcast), but when the caller asked for an unbounded wait the proof wait is bounded by `UNCONFIRMED_BROADCAST_PROOF_TIMEOUT` and its expiry is translated back into the `TransactionBroadcastUnconfirmed` callers used to get promptly. Callers that supplied their own timeout are untouched, `FinalityTimeout` and all — the shielded seed pool treats that error as a pacing signal, so re-typing it for everyone would break a working flow to fix a different one. Also on the `Broadcast` arm: a definite `Rejected` is no longer swallowed. That arm logged every broadcast error and fell through to `wait_for_proof`, which is right for the ambiguous verdict but guarantees a dead wait for a verdict that means the send provably did not happen. It now surfaces the error and drops the row via the new `untrack_unproven_broadcast_asset_lock`, so cleanup is not lost and a later resume does not re-enter the same wait. That untrack is a separate method rather than a widening of `untrack_asset_lock`. The existing method's caller in `build.rs` uses "the row was removed" as its trigger to RELEASE the funding-input reservation, and deliberately spares rows that advanced to `Broadcast` concurrently because that is evidence the transaction reached the network. Teaching it to remove `Broadcast` rows would release reservations for inputs whose transaction may be live — a double-spend opening. The new method releases no reservation, and guards on `proof.is_none()` plus the `Consumed` terminal state from #4347. Tests: 5 new cases. The two hang regressions are pinned with `start_paused` runtimes and were confirmed to hang the test binary indefinitely when the fixes are reverted.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAsset-lock resumability now includes ChangesAsset-lock recovery
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The PR bounds previously indefinite waits and restores visibility for recovered locks, but two correctness risks remain: a persistence failure can hide the already-consumed result, and removing an unproven broadcast record after a rejected retry can erase tracking for a transaction that may already have been sent. The latter can lead to unsafe recovery behavior, so the PR is not ready to merge until addressed. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Wallet
participant AssetLockManager
participant Broadcaster
Wallet->>Broadcaster: Resume Built or Broadcast lock
Broadcaster-->>Wallet: Broadcast result
Wallet->>AssetLockManager: Wait for proof or remove rejected lock
AssetLockManager-->>Wallet: Recovery state or typed error
Possibly related issues
Possibly related PRs
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In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/orchestration.rs`:
- Around line 500-507: Update the chain_proof branch in the asset-lock
already-consumed handling so failures from mark_asset_lock_consumption_unknown
are logged and ignored rather than propagated with ?. Preserve the typed
AssetLockAlreadyConsumed error path, matching the best-effort behavior used when
ChainLock retrieval fails.
In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/sync/recovery.rs`:
- Around line 363-375: Update the Rejected branch in the defensive re-broadcast
handling of resume_asset_lock to return the broadcast error without calling
untrack_unproven_broadcast_asset_lock or queueing its changeset. Preserve the
existing warning, and update the regression test to assert that the Broadcast
row remains tracked and persisted after rejection.
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packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/dao/AssetLockDao.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/entities/AssetLockEntity.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/AssetLockResumableDaoTest.ktpackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/orchestration.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/sync/recovery.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/sync/tracking.rspackages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/SwiftExampleApp/Core/Views/IdentitiesContentView.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/SwiftExampleApp/Utils/PersistentAssetLockDisplay.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/SwiftExampleAppTests/CreateIdentityResumableTests.swift
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…remaining resume waits Both behaviors this PR's first revision introduced on `resume_asset_lock`'s `Broadcast` arm were defective as shipped. 1. `Rejected` is not evidence about the row The arm dropped an unproven `Broadcast` row when the defensive re-broadcast returned `BroadcastError::Rejected`, on the premise that the verdict proves the transaction never reached the network. It does not. With the production `SpvBroadcaster`, `Rejected` is reachable from exactly two places — a client that was never started (`spv/runtime.rs:222`) and dash-spv's zero-connected-peers check (`:125`) — so it is a statement about the attempt that just failed, never about the ORIGINAL broadcast that moved the row to `Broadcast` in an earlier process. That made the untrack routinely destructive. `catchUpStuckAssetLocks` runs on every wallet load, selects `statusRaw < 2` (which includes `Broadcast` = 1) and has no SPV-connected gate, so an ordinary offline relaunch deleted the tracking row for an asset lock that may well be mined — with no way back, because reconstruction re-inserts only on a FRESH detection event, which an already-recorded mined transaction never produces again. The row is now left exactly as it was and the typed error is surfaced. No state on this path makes non-dispatch of the original send provable (a row can sit at `Built` after a successful broadcast too, when the app died between the send and the status advance), so `untrack_unproven_broadcast_asset_lock` has no justified caller and is removed rather than left loaded. 2. The `Broadcast` arm's proof wait was still unbounded The first revision bounded only the `Built` arm. Its own retained behavior — advance an ambiguous `Built` lock to `Broadcast` and leave the row there — routes exactly that lock into the `Broadcast` arm on the next resume pass, where a bare `wait_for_proof(out_point, timeout)` with `timeout = None` waits on `Notify` forever. The hang was deferred by one pass, not removed, and under the FFI's `runtime().block_on(...)` it pins the host thread for good. Both remaining waits now substitute `UNCONFIRMED_BROADCAST_PROOF_TIMEOUT` when the caller asked for an unbounded one: - `Broadcast`: expiry is re-typed to `TransactionBroadcastUnconfirmed` and the row is left at `Broadcast`. The bound costs nothing — a proof that lands after it is returned by the next resume on `wait_for_proof`'s first iteration, straight from the record. - `RecoveredFromChain`'s proof-less fallback: bounded for uniformity. Its "resolves immediately by construction" argument holds only while the chain-locked record is reachable, and the accident that loses a row's persisted proof can take the record with it. `FinalityTimeout` is kept there — nothing is broadcast on that path. Callers that supply their own timeout are unchanged in both arms (`or` is the identity on `Some`; the re-typing is gated on `timeout.is_none()`), so the shielded seed pool keeps reading `FinalityTimeout` as a pacing signal. The `Built` arm's `Ok`-verdict wait stays unbounded: `Ok` is the broadcaster's positive network-acceptance contract for a send that just happened, the same evidence the initial funding path waits on. Tests: 3 new cases, 1 rewritten, 1 removed. Each new case was confirmed against its defect — both bound regressions hang the test binary indefinitely when the bound is reverted, and the untrack case fails with `left: None, right: Some(Broadcast)` when the untrack is restored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both of the F3 behaviors I added in the first revision of this PR were defective. Fixed in c017d88. F3(c) — untracking a I justified it with "the broadcaster only reaches That made it a data-loss path on a completely ordinary flow. The arm now surfaces the typed error and leaves the row exactly as it was. I looked for a state where non-dispatch of the original send is provable and there isn't one on this path — a F3(a) — I bounded only the The behavior I deliberately kept — advance an ambiguous
Callers passing their own timeout are untouched in both arms ( Reachability caveat. The Tests: 3 new, 1 rewritten, 1 removed. Each new case was confirmed against its defect, not just observed green — the two bound regressions hang the test binary when the bound is reverted, and the untrack case fails |
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The recovery timeout and tracking changes are sound, but the newly added shielded resumable query is not consumed by any production host surface, so funding-type 5 locks remain inaccessible after restart. The Kotlin address-top-up UI also mishandles the newly exposed RecoveredFromChain rows, and the FFI documentation still promises an unbounded zero-timeout wait that is now state-dependent.
Source: reviewers gpt-5.6-sol (ffi-engineer, general, security-auditor); final verifier gpt-5.6-sol. openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is orchestration-only and not reviewer evidence.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
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In `packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/dao/AssetLockDao.kt`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/persistence/dao/AssetLockDao.kt:100-108: The shielded resumable query has no production consumer
This new query is called only by its Room tests, so adding it does not make funding-type 5 locks visible or resumable. The Kotlin production UI still calls `observeResumableAddressTopUps`, which is fixed to funding type 4, and `ShieldedFundScreen` only starts fresh funding; it never receives an existing lock or invokes `shieldedResumeFundFromAssetLock`. The Swift host has the same gap: `PendingPlatformFundFromAssetLocksList` filters for funding type 4, while `WalletDetailView` constructs `ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView` without `resumeFromLock`. Consequently, a stalled or RecoveredFromChain shielded top-up remains absent from every production recovery surface after restart, which leaves the PR's stated shielded invisibility defect unresolved. Wire funding-type 5 rows into a host list and route its Resume action through the existing shielded resume API on both supported hosts.
In `packages/kotlin-sdk/KotlinExampleApp/app/src/main/java/org/dashfoundation/example/ui/funding/AssetLockDisplay.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/kotlin-sdk/KotlinExampleApp/app/src/main/java/org/dashfoundation/example/ui/funding/AssetLockDisplay.kt:24-47: Kotlin still treats RecoveredFromChain as non-resumable and proofless
`observeResumableAddressTopUps` now returns status 5 rows to the Kotlin pending-top-up UI, but these shared display predicates still recognize only statuses 1 through 3. A recovered row therefore renders as `Unknown(5)`, and `FundFromAssetLockScreen` takes the `canFundIdentity == false` branch and says it is waiting for finality even though RecoveredFromChain denotes proven Core finality and normally carries a chain proof. Match the updated Swift mapping by admitting status 5 in both predicates and naming it in `statusLabel`; update the existing display tests accordingly.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/asset_lock/sync.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/asset_lock/sync.rs:61-63: Update the zero-timeout FFI contract to match the new bounded policy
The FFI comments for both `asset_lock_manager_resume` and `asset_lock_manager_catch_up_blocking`, plus the latter's Rustdoc, still say that `timeout_secs == 0` waits indefinitely. This PR makes `None` state-dependent: Built plus MaybeSent, every Broadcast lock, and a proofless RecoveredFromChain lock now use the 180-second internal bound, while only a Built lock whose re-broadcast returns `Ok` retains an unbounded proof wait. A caller passing the documented zero sentinel can therefore receive `TransactionBroadcastUnconfirmed` or `FinalityTimeout` after 180 seconds. Keep the bounded behavior, but document zero as selecting the recovery policy's state-dependent default rather than promising an unconditional infinite wait.
| @Query( | ||
| "SELECT * FROM asset_locks WHERE walletId = :walletId " + | ||
| "AND fundingTypeRaw = :fundingTypeRaw " + | ||
| "AND ((statusRaw >= 1 AND statusRaw <= 3) OR statusRaw = 5)" | ||
| ) | ||
| fun observeResumableTopUpsByFundingType( | ||
| walletId: ByteArray, | ||
| fundingTypeRaw: Int, | ||
| ): Flow<List<AssetLockEntity>> |
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🔴 Blocking: The shielded resumable query has no production consumer
This new query is called only by its Room tests, so adding it does not make funding-type 5 locks visible or resumable. The Kotlin production UI still calls observeResumableAddressTopUps, which is fixed to funding type 4, and ShieldedFundScreen only starts fresh funding; it never receives an existing lock or invokes shieldedResumeFundFromAssetLock. The Swift host has the same gap: PendingPlatformFundFromAssetLocksList filters for funding type 4, while WalletDetailView constructs ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView without resumeFromLock. Consequently, a stalled or RecoveredFromChain shielded top-up remains absent from every production recovery surface after restart, which leaves the PR's stated shielded invisibility defect unresolved. Wire funding-type 5 rows into a host list and route its Resume action through the existing shielded resume API on both supported hosts.
source: ['codex']
2 participants
Summary
Three audit findings on the merged asset-lock recovery surface, from a review of #4347, #4357 and #4367 at the
v4.2-devtip (c99872b08b). Each is a regression introduced by one of those PRs; each is fixed here with tests.F1 — recovered asset locks are invisible (#4347)
Chain-locked enrichment promotes tracked locks to
AssetLockStatus::RecoveredFromChain(discriminant 5) insync/reconstruction.rs, but every host resume surface expressed "still recoverable" as the contiguous range1..3. Status 5 sits above the terminalConsumed(4) numerically while being decidedly non-terminal, so those filters dropped exactly the rows the restore scan had just rebuilt.User scenario. A user funds a Platform address top-up. It confirms and gets chain-locked. They restore the wallet from seed. The restore scan rebuilds the lock, attaches a real
ChainAssetLockProof, and writes status 5 — and then the top-up appears nowhere: not in Pending Platform Top Ups, not in Resumable Registrations. The Swift UI labelled itUnknown(5). Rust would resume it happily; nothing in the UI can reach it, so the funds read as lost.AssetLockDao.observeResumableAddressTopUpsnow admits1..3 ∪ {5}.4stays excluded — it is the tombstoneresume_asset_lockrejects, and re-surfacing it recreates the perpetual-spinner row the fix(platform-wallet): finalize reconstructed asset locks as RecoveredFromChain, in-session #4347 guard prevents.AssetLockDao.observeResumableTopUpsByFundingType. Shielded address top-ups (funding type 5) had no resumable query at all: the address query is pinned to funding type 4, and the identity-recovery surface admits only funding types 0..2. A stalled shielded top-up was invisible everywhere.isVisibleAsResumable/canFundIdentityaccept 5 andstatusLabelnames it;crossWalletResumableLocksnow reuses the shared predicate rather than restating the range.One deviation from the filed finding. The finding proposed also mapping funding types 4/5 into
TrackedAssetLock.FundingType. I did not do that, because that enum is the identity-recovery eligibility filter and its consumers assert on it —IdentityRegistration.registerIdentityrequiresIDENTITY_REGISTRATION,IdentityCreditsrequires the two top-up variants. Admitting address/shielded locks would route them into pickers whoserequire(...)then throws: a new crash path, not a fix. The correct surface for those funding types is the DAO query above. Its status 5 mapping was already present and is unchanged.F2 — unbounded ChainLock wait in reconciliation (#4357)
reconcile_asset_lock_submit_resultupgrades an Instant proof viaupgrade_to_chain_lock_proof(out_point, chain_lock_timeout), and all three production call sites passNone(identity/network/registration.rs:272,:512,platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rs:272). TheNonearm ofwait_for_chain_lockis an unbounded loop.User scenario. A lock is IS-locked and consumed seconds after broadcast, so Platform answers with the unauthenticated "already consumed" report while the ChainLock is still ~2.5 minutes away — or never arrives, because the device is offline or SPV is not connected. Every call site reaches this under an FFI
runtime().block_on(...), so the host thread that made the call is pinned, not merely delayed. Pre-#4357 this returned a typed error immediately.Nonenow selectsRECONCILIATION_CHAIN_LOCK_TIMEOUT(180s). Because the ChainLock is wanted only as evidence to record alongside a report about an operation that has already terminated, failure to obtain it degrades rather than propagates: the lock keeps its status and the typedAssetLockAlreadyConsumedis still returned, so the code-24 signal is preserved and the caller can retry. #4357's proof retention is untouched whenever the ChainLock is reachable inside the bound.F3 —
MaybeSenttreated as "accepted" (#4367)A
MaybeSentbroadcast outcome on aBuiltlock advances it toBroadcast. ButMaybeSentis the normal verdict for a genuinely rejected transaction:DapiBroadcasterclassifies every failure asMaybeSentby construction (broadcaster.rs:103-119), and the SPV broadcaster reachesRejectedonly onNotConnected(spv/runtime.rs:126-130; no BIP61 in modern Dash).User scenario. A resume re-broadcasts a transaction the network rejects. The verdict is
MaybeSent, the lock advances toBroadcast, andwait_for_proof(None)waits for a proof that can never arrive — a failure that used to surface in ~30 seconds now never returns.(a) The advance is kept — it is what stops each recovery pass repeating the same broadcast — but when the caller asked for an unbounded wait, the proof wait is bounded by
UNCONFIRMED_BROADCAST_PROOF_TIMEOUTand its expiry is translated back into the pre-#4367TransactionBroadcastUnconfirmed. Callers that supplied their own timeout are untouched,FinalityTimeoutand all: the shielded seed pool treats that error as a pacing signal, so re-typing it for everyone would break a working flow to fix a different one.(b)
untrack_unproven_broadcast_asset_lockremovesBroadcastrows that carry no proof, preserving the #4347Consumed-terminal guard.(c) The
Broadcastarm no longer swallows a definiteRejected. It logged every broadcast error and fell through towait_for_proof— right for the ambiguous verdict, but a guaranteed dead wait for a verdict meaning the send provably did not happen. It now surfaces the error and drops the unproven row.A second deviation, for fund safety. The finding asked to widen
untrack_asset_lockitself. I added a separate method instead.untrack_asset_lock's caller inbuild.rs:954uses "the row was removed" as its trigger to release the funding-input reservation, and deliberately spares rows a concurrent resume advanced toBroadcastbecause that is evidence the transaction reached the network. Teaching it to removeBroadcastrows would release reservations for inputs whose transaction may be live — a double-spend opening. The new method releases no reservation and guards onproof.is_none()plus the terminal state.Test evidence
cargo test -p platform-wallet --features shielded— 851 passed, 0 failed, 3 pre-existing ignored.cargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi --features shielded— 318 passed, 0 failed.:sdk:testDebugUnitTest --tests AssetLockResumableDaoTest— 7 passed, 0 failed (Robolectric, in-memory Room).cargo clippy -p platform-wallet --features shielded --tests -- -D warnings— clean.cargo fmt --check— clean. Default-feature build also checked.12 tests added:
already_consumed_reconciliation_terminates_without_a_chainlock— Instant proof, record present but not chain-locked, no chainlock ever delivered,chain_lock_timeout: None. Asserts it resolves at all, resolves asAssetLockAlreadyConsumed, and does not promote the lock without a proof.TransactionBroadcastUnconfirmedwith the row still atBroadcast; bounded callers still getFinalityTimeout; definite rejection on aBroadcastlock surfaces and untracks; the untrack spares proven,Consumed,RecoveredFromChainandBuiltrows.The two hang regressions were verified to reproduce: with the F3 fixes reverted, the test binary hung indefinitely with no output rather than failing, which is the defect itself. The
start_pausedruntimes let the bounded versions complete instantly.Residual limitations
SwiftExampleAppneeds a builtDashSDKFFI.xcframework, which is not present in this worktree, soxcodebuildcannot resolve the package graph. The Swift edits are small and local (two predicates, one label case, one added test).mark_asset_lock_consumption_unknownrejects a non-Chain proof by design — and matches pre-fix(platform-wallet): preserve reported-consumed asset-lock recovery #4357 behavior. A later retry can still attach the proof.mark_asset_lock_consumption_unknownerrors still propagate in F2's has-proof path (e.g. missing persistence capabilities), which can still mask the code-24 signal. Left as-is: that is pre-existing behavior on a path where a persistence failure should be loud, and changing it is outside this scope.CL_FALLBACK_TIMEOUT. Happy to thread explicit per-call-site timeouts instead if reviewers prefer.Broadcastrow — the resume path holds no reservation token. Conservative: inputs stay reserved until the TTL backstop.Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes