feat(kotlin-sdk): coinjoin-drain shielded funding binding + typed asset-lock shortfall - #4361
feat(kotlin-sdk): coinjoin-drain shielded funding binding + typed asset-lock shortfall#4361bfoss765 wants to merge 10 commits into
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…et-lock shortfall The two Android-facing pieces that #4327 left out. #4327 added the CoinJoin-drain asset-lock funding FFI export (`platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock_coinjoin_drain`) and its Swift wrapper, but no Kotlin/JNI, so Android could not call CoinJoin-funded shielding at all. This adds the JNI export and the Kotlin surface, following the Swift wrapper's contract: no amount (the lock value is the builder's Sigma inputs - L1 fee) and no surplus output (the single-recipient remainder flow pins the consensus surplus to zero). It also allocates the typed asset-lock shortfall at its long-reserved code 29. The FFI error registry has held 29 for `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` since #4184, and every host mirror already documents the number, but the code was never allocated: #4184 and its successor #4316 were both closed unmerged, leaving the producing `PlatformWalletError` variant absent too. Without it an asset-lock coin-selection shortfall flattens to `ErrorUnknown` (99) and hosts must substring-match the Display text. The empty-candidate-set case now stays on the same structured path as a partial shortfall instead of falling through to the generic string form. Draining an empty CoinJoin account is exactly a coin-selection shortfall, so the two halves meet at the same call: the Android mixed-funds migration needs the binding to run and the typed code to explain a failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 3 included reviews per hour; 2 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds typed asset-lock insufficient-funds errors with native code 29. It also adds CoinJoin account drain funding across the Rust platform wallet, JNI bridge, and Kotlin SDK. ChangesAsset-lock CoinJoin funding
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This PR adds the Android CoinJoin-drain funding path and exposes typed asset-lock shortfall errors without any actionable merge-blocking risk remaining; it is merge-ready after normal checks and review. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant KotlinCaller
participant PlatformWalletManager
participant FundingNative
participant JNI
participant RustPlatformWallet
KotlinCaller->>PlatformWalletManager: call shieldedFundFromCoinJoinDrain
PlatformWalletManager->>FundingNative: pass wallet, recipient, and account index
FundingNative->>JNI: invoke native drain method
JNI->>RustPlatformWallet: drain CoinJoin account into asset lock
RustPlatformWallet-->>JNI: return status or typed error code
JNI-->>FundingNative: forward result
FundingNative-->>PlatformWalletManager: complete or raise mapped error
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4361 +/- ##
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- Coverage 87.63% 85.28% -2.35%
============================================
Files 2670 2712 +42
Lines 339447 356289 +16842
============================================
+ Hits 297464 303869 +6405
- Misses 41983 52420 +10437
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thepastaclaw
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The new JNI/Kotlin drain binding follows the sibling safety patterns, but the typed asset-lock shortfall remains incomplete across three paths: empty drains carry a 0/0 amount pair, exact BIP44 funding erases code 29, and Swift decodes code 29 as unknown. These are client-facing error-contract defects rather than consensus blockers, so the review contains three suggestions.
Source: reviewer backend model gpt-5.6-sol (Codex general, FFI engineer, and Rust quality lanes); final verifier backend model gpt-5.6-sol (Codex). Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol (not reviewer evidence).
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
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2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rs:193: Empty CoinJoin drains report a zero required amount
`DrainAll` is converted to the builder's zero-valued output placeholder at lines 126-132, and that placeholder is passed here as the fallback `required` amount. When an empty CoinJoin account produces `SelectionError::NoUtxosAvailable`, the new mapper therefore returns `AssetLockInsufficientFunds { available: 0, required: 0 }`, even though the operation cannot proceed with zero funds. The shielded flow has already computed a positive `minimum_lock_duffs` from the Type 18 pool fee and threads it through `AssetLockBuildAmount::DrainAll`; use that floor for amount-less selection errors so the advertised available/required pair describes the actual shortfall.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs:1024-1030: Exact-amount shielded funding erases the typed shortfall
The PR promotes asset-lock builder shortfalls to `PlatformWalletError::AssetLockInsufficientFunds` and maps that variant to FFI code 29, but this existing exact-amount endpoint replaces every wallet error with `ErrorWalletOperation` (6). Consequently, Kotlin's newly documented `shieldedFundFromAssetLock` producer can never raise `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds`; only the CoinJoin-drain sibling preserves the typed conversion. Route the new shortfall variant through `From<PlatformWalletError>` while retaining the endpoint's existing catch-all behavior and contextual message for unrelated failures.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift:89-97: Swift does not decode the newly allocated FFI error code
Rust now emits `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` at code 29, including from the existing Swift `shieldedFundFromCoinJoinDrain` wrapper. Swift only mentions the reservation in this comment: `PlatformWalletResultCode` has no code-29 case, `init(ffi:)` has no corresponding C-enum arm and falls through to `.errorUnknown`, and `PlatformWalletError` has no typed shortfall case. Add code 29 to the Swift result enum, C-enum conversion, typed error construction and description handling, plus a regression mapping test analogous to the existing code mappings.
…r, in typed shortfalls
An empty CoinJoin drain surfaced AssetLockInsufficientFunds
{ available: 0, required: 0 } because the drain's zero-valued
credit-output placeholder was passed as the requested amount. The
shielded flow already threads the positive minimum through
AssetLockBuildAmount::DrainAll; use that floor for amount-less
selection errors so the advertised pair describes the actual gap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs`:
- Around line 272-278: Update the drain-shortfall documentation in
packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs lines 272-278 to state that required
equals minimum_lock_duffs when a drain floor is configured, and equals zero only
when no floor exists. Also update the mapper contract in
packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rs lines 994-999 to
match the minimum_lock_duffs.unwrap_or(0) value passed by the asset-lock build
flow.
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packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/errors/DashSdkError.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/FundingNative.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/errors/DashSdkErrorTest.ktpackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rspackages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/funding.rs
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The Kotlin/JNI CoinJoin-drain binding follows the existing ownership and boundary-validation patterns, and the latest commit fixes the previously reported empty-drain amount pair. Three in-scope suggestions remain: exact-amount funding still erases code 29, Swift does not decode code 29, and the public drain-shortfall documentation still describes the removed 0/0 behavior.
Source: reviewers gpt-5.6-sol (general) and gpt-5.6-sol (FFI engineer); final verifier gpt-5.6-sol. Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol (not reviewer evidence).
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
🟡 3 suggestion(s)
2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs:1024-1029: Exact-amount shielded funding erases the typed shortfall
This endpoint converts every `PlatformWalletError` into `ErrorWalletOperation` (6), bypassing the new blanket conversion that maps `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` to code 29. The Kotlin `shieldedFundFromAssetLock` path invokes this exact endpoint and only constructs `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` when native code 29 reaches it, so an exact-amount coin-selection shortfall still arrives as the generic `WalletOperation` error despite the newly documented typed contract. Preserve the endpoint's contextual catch-all for unrelated failures, but pass the new shortfall variant through `From<PlatformWalletError>`.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift:88-97: Swift does not decode the newly allocated FFI error code
Rust now emits `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` with raw value 29, including from the CoinJoin-drain endpoint called by Swift before `result.check()`. Swift only mentions code 29 in the reservation comment: `PlatformWalletResultCode` has no code-29 case, `init(ffi:)` has no corresponding C-enum arm and therefore falls through to `.errorUnknown`, and `PlatformWalletError` has no typed asset-lock shortfall case. Add the result-code case, C-enum conversion, typed error construction and description handling, plus a mapping regression test that pins raw code 29.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs:272-278: Drain shortfall documentation still promises the removed 0/0 result
The latest commit passes `minimum_lock_duffs.unwrap_or(0)` to `map_builder_error`, and the shielded flow replaces the caller's value with a positive Type 18 pool-fee floor before building. An empty shielded CoinJoin drain therefore reports `available: 0` and that positive floor as `required`, not 0/0 as these public variant docs claim. The mapper contract in `wallet/asset_lock/build.rs` lines 994-999 repeats the obsolete behavior; update both comments to say that `required` is the configured drain floor, or zero only when no floor is provided.
# Conflicts: # packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rs
…not 0/0 The typed-shortfall docs still promised 'available: 0, required: 0' for an empty drain; since the mapper passes minimum_lock_duffs.unwrap_or(0) as required, an empty drain with a configured floor (the shielded flow installs the positive Type 18 pool-fee floor before building) reports that floor, and only a floor-less drain reports 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The JNI/Kotlin CoinJoin-drain binding follows the established boundary-validation and ownership patterns, and the configured drain-floor documentation is now correct. Three client-facing suggestions remain: exact-amount funding flattens the new typed shortfall, Swift cannot decode code 29, and the new shortfall documentation incorrectly describes pooled exact funding as single-account funding. No consensus-blocking issue was found.
Source: reviewer backend models gpt-5.6-sol (general), gpt-5.6-sol (ffi-engineer), and gpt-5.6-sol (rust-quality); final verifier backend model gpt-5.6-sol.
Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol (not reviewer evidence).
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
🟡 3 suggestion(s)
2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs:626-630: Exact-amount shielded funding erases the typed shortfall
`platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` passes the exact-amount wallet result through this helper. Although this PR maps `PlatformWalletError::AssetLockInsufficientFunds` to FFI code 29 in the blanket conversion, the helper preserves only `AssetLockAlreadyConsumed` and converts the new shortfall to `ErrorWalletOperation` (6). The Kotlin wrapper calls this endpoint and explicitly documents `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` as a possible result, but its code-29 mapping can never be reached for an exact-amount selection failure. Pass the new shortfall through while retaining the contextual catch-all for unrelated failures, and extend the helper regression test accordingly.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift:88-97: Swift does not decode the newly allocated FFI error code
Rust now emits `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` with raw value 29, including from the CoinJoin-drain endpoint that Swift invokes before calling `result.check()`. Swift only reserves the number in this comment: `PlatformWalletResultCode` has no code-29 case, `init(ffi:)` has no corresponding C-enum arm and therefore falls through to `.errorUnknown`, and `PlatformWalletError` has no typed shortfall case. An empty or underfunded CoinJoin drain consequently becomes `.unknown` on iOS. Add the result-code case, C-enum conversion, typed error construction and description handling, plus a mapping regression test that pins raw code 29.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rs:289-293: Shortfall documentation contradicts pooled asset-lock funding
These new public docs say `available` always describes one selected account and that asset-lock funding never unions accounts. The exact-amount path calls `build_asset_lock_transaction_with_funding` with `ASSET_LOCK_FUNDING_SOURCES`, which explicitly pools the BIP44 and BIP32 accounts plus every DashPay contact-receiving account; a builder shortfall can therefore describe that permitted union. Only `DrainAccountBalance`, including the CoinJoin migration, selects exactly one account. Update this documentation and the matching new FFI and Kotlin comments so hosts do not present an exact-amount pooled shortfall as a single-account failure.
…ontier reference The registry called 29 lapsed, but #4361's head declares ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds = 29 — the typed asset-lock shortfall carried the allocation forward when #4316 closed. Row 29 now records the live owner and lineage. The remaining instructions that still pointed PR #3968 (and any new allocation) at the obsolete 38 frontier now point at the frontier note, and the 2026-08-04 verification checklist is date-stamped as the historical snapshot it is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…on exact-amount builds The new shortfall docs claimed 'available' always describes the one account the caller selected and that asset-lock funding never unions accounts. Wrong for the exact-amount path: it funds through ASSET_LOCK_FUNDING_SOURCES, which pools the BIP44 and BIP32 accounts with every DashPay contact-receiving account, so that shortfall describes the whole permitted union. Only a whole-account drain build (CoinJoin's only form — mixed coins are never pooled) names a single account's shortfall. Corrected in the Rust error docs, the FFI code-29 docs, the Kotlin AssetLockInsufficientFunds KDoc, and the Kotlin error test narrative; also repaired the block's two pre-existing broken intra-doc links (CoreInsufficientFunds / CorePooledInsufficientFunds) with reference definitions. Doc-only; no funding behavior changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The JNI/Kotlin CoinJoin-drain binding follows the established boundary-validation and ownership patterns, and the pooled-funding documentation issue has been corrected at the current head. Two client-facing suggestions remain: exact-amount funding still flattens the new typed shortfall, and Swift cannot decode emitted code 29; neither is consensus-blocking.
Source: reviewer backend model gpt-5.6-sol for the Codex general, FFI engineer, and Rust quality lanes; final verifier backend model gpt-5.6-sol. Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol, not reviewer evidence.
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
🟡 2 suggestion(s)
2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs:626-629: Exact-amount shielded funding erases the typed shortfall
`platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` sends its result through this helper. Although the new blanket `From<PlatformWalletError>` conversion maps `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` to FFI code 29, this match preserves only `AssetLockAlreadyConsumed` and converts the shortfall to `ErrorWalletOperation` (6). The Kotlin exact-amount API therefore cannot produce its documented `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` for a pooled coin-selection shortfall. Preserve the new typed variant through the blanket conversion while retaining the contextual generic mapping for unrelated failures, and extend the helper test to pin code 29.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift:88-97: Swift does not decode the newly allocated FFI error code
Rust now emits `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` with raw value 29, including from `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock_coinjoin_drain`, which the Swift wrapper invokes before calling `result.check()`. Swift only mentions the reservation in this comment: `PlatformWalletResultCode` has no raw-value-29 case, `init(ffi:)` has no corresponding C-enum arm and falls through to `.errorUnknown`, and `PlatformWalletError` has no typed shortfall case. Empty or underfunded CoinJoin drains therefore surface as `.unknown` on iOS. Add the result-code case, C-enum conversion, typed error construction and description handling, plus a regression test that pins raw code 29.
cargo fmt --check --all is a gate in the Rust workspace tests workflow and 18ce5d8 left one arm unformatted, failing the whole job in 40s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The Kotlin/JNI CoinJoin-drain binding follows the established boundary-validation, ownership, and error-translation patterns, and no consensus-critical issue was found. Two client-facing error-contract gaps remain: exact-amount funding still flattens the new typed shortfall, and Swift still decodes emitted code 29 as unknown.
Source: reviewer backend model gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend model gpt-5.6-sol. Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol is not reviewer evidence.
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
🟡 2 suggestion(s)
2 additional finding(s) omitted (not in diff).
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs:626-629: Exact-amount shielded funding erases the typed shortfall
`platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` passes its result through this helper. The new blanket `From<PlatformWalletError>` conversion maps `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` to FFI code 29, but this match preserves only `AssetLockAlreadyConsumed` and converts the new shortfall to `ErrorWalletOperation` (6). Consequently, the Kotlin exact-amount API cannot produce its documented `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` for a pooled coin-selection shortfall. Preserve the typed shortfall through the blanket conversion while retaining the contextual generic mapping for unrelated failures, and extend the helper test to pin code 29.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift:88-97: Swift does not decode the newly allocated FFI error code
Rust now emits `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` with raw value 29, including from `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock_coinjoin_drain`, which the existing Swift wrapper invokes before calling `result.check()`. Swift only mentions the reservation in this comment: `PlatformWalletResultCode` has no raw-value-29 case, `init(ffi:)` has no corresponding C-enum arm and falls through to `.errorUnknown`, and `PlatformWalletError` has no typed shortfall case. Empty or underfunded CoinJoin drains therefore surface as `.unknown` on iOS. Add the result-code case, C-enum conversion, typed error construction and description handling, plus a regression test that pins raw code 29.
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Status for a resolution pass — head `35dbd8c4c`. The shortfall-docs thread is addressed in `18ce5d83bf` (pooled-funding correction). CI red earlier was a |
…exact-amount funding path `map_asset_lock_funding_result` preserved only `AssetLockAlreadyConsumed` and sent everything else to the generic `ErrorWalletOperation` (6) catch-all. `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` therefore never reached its blanket-`From` arm, so the dedicated `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` (29) that `error.rs` has always produced could not actually cross the boundary through `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` — the exact-amount funding form — or through its resume sibling. Hosts saw the same code every unclassified wallet failure uses and were left substring-matching the Display text. Add the typed arm so both entry points hand the variant to the blanket impl, which also carries the structured available/required duffs verbatim (`PlatformWalletFFIResult` is ABI-frozen at code + message, so the figures ride the message or not at all). Extend the helper test to pin 29 through the exact-amount entry point and cover the resume sibling, mirroring `error::tests::asset_lock_insufficient_funds_maps_to_dedicated_code`. Rename the existing case, whose `_code_only` name asserted exactly the behaviour this changes.
…ift boundary Swift could not decode code 29 at all: `PlatformWalletResultCode` had no raw-value case for it and `init(ffi:)` had no arm, so every asset-lock coin-selection shortfall fell through to `.errorUnknown` and surfaced as `PlatformWalletError.unknown`. Kotlin has mirrored 29 as `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` since this branch's binding landed, so the boundary was typed on one host and blind on the other. Mirror it the same way the neighbouring asset-lock codes are: the raw-value case in numeric order, the C-enum arm beside its 23/24/25 siblings, the typed `PlatformWalletError.assetLockInsufficientFunds` case, and its arms in `errorDescription` and `init(code:message:)` — that switch is exhaustive over the code enum, so the new case has to be handled there. The shortfall figures ride the message unaltered. Refresh the in-file allocation note, which still described 29 as claimed outside this PR, to match the wording in `error.rs`. Extend `ErrorHandlingTests` with the mapping, a pin on the hand-mirrored raw value, and the typed-error decode, following `testShieldedInsufficientBalanceFFIResultMapping`.
…ady there The row read as though 29 was covered at both host boundaries. It was not: Kotlin has mirrored it since #4361's binding commit `a711c55eca`, but Swift carried none of rule 5's three edits, so `init(ffi:)`'s `default:` swallowed 29 into `.errorUnknown` — precisely the one-host failure this file exists to catch, and it was going unrecorded on a row in this table. #4361 now closes it at `15aa2caea1` (raw case, `init(ffi:)` arm, typed `PlatformWalletError` case with its `init(result:)` arm, and an `ErrorHandlingTests` pin on the raw value). Cite that commit and the date the row becomes true, alongside its Rust sibling `2eac8a897e`, which is what lets 29 reach a host at all from the exact-amount funding path.
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Inline comments:
In
`@packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- Around line 79-94: Update the asset-lock insufficient-funds documentation to
distinguish funding forms: for exact-amount funding, advise refreshing preflight
and confirming a smaller amount; for whole-account drain funding, describe a
separate drain-specific recovery action without suggesting a caller-selected
amount. Apply this wording at PlatformWalletResult.swift lines 79-94 and
347-353, and mirror the distinction in shielded_send.rs lines 629-632.
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Both error-contract findings are fixed. Exact-amount path flattening the shortfall ( Swift mirror for 29 — 15aa2ca. Swift could not decode 29 at all: no raw-value case, no Verification: |
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The current head fixes both previously reported cross-language error-contract gaps: exact-amount and resume funding preserve FFI code 29, and Swift now decodes it as a typed error. Two in-scope suggestions remain: the recovery documentation does not distinguish exact-amount funding from amount-less drains, and the drain-floor regression test bypasses the builder branch whose wiring it is intended to protect.
Source: reviewer backend model gpt-5.6-sol (general, FFI engineer, Rust quality, and security auditor); final verifier backend model gpt-5.6-sol. Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol (not reviewer evidence).
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
🟡 2 suggestion(s)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift:79-94: Distinguish drain recovery from exact-amount recovery
`errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` is produced by both exact-amount funding and the CoinJoin whole-account drain. The current guidance tells every caller to confirm a smaller amount, but the drain API deliberately accepts no amount and consumes the selected account's entire spendable balance. This gives drain callers an impossible recovery action. State that exact-amount funding can refresh preflight and retry with a smaller amount, while a drain must refresh or sync the selected account, or replenish it, before retrying. Apply the same distinction to the `PlatformWalletError.assetLockInsufficientFunds` documentation at lines 347-353 and the FFI mapping documentation in `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs` at lines 629-632.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rs:226-232: Exercise the drain floor through the asset-lock builder
The new regression test calls `map_builder_error` directly with `12_345`, so it verifies only that `SelectionError::NoUtxosAvailable` preserves the supplied fallback. It never exercises the new `AssetLockBuildAmount::DrainAll` branch that substitutes `minimum_lock_duffs` for the builder's zero-valued output placeholder. Reverting this branch to `map_builder_error(e, amount_duffs)` would restore the original `available: 0, required: 0` drain result while the test continued to pass. Add an async build-level test with an empty or fully reserved CoinJoin account and `DrainAll { minimum_lock_duffs: Some(12_345) }`, then assert `AssetLockInsufficientFunds { available: 0, required: 12_345 }`.
| /// Asset-lock coin selection came up short over the *permitted* funding | ||
| /// set (dashpay/platform#4073). Nothing was built or broadcast and no | ||
| /// funding output was consumed, so the caller may refresh its preflight | ||
| /// and confirm a smaller amount. | ||
| /// | ||
| /// The structured `available` / `required` duff amounts travel in the | ||
| /// message string — `PlatformWalletFFIResult` is ABI-frozen at code + | ||
| /// message, so there are no out-params for them. | ||
| /// | ||
| /// Distinct from `errorCoreInsufficientFunds` (22), which is the atomic | ||
| /// Core-send selector rather than the asset-lock builder. What the figures | ||
| /// cover depends on the funding form: an exact-amount build pools the | ||
| /// default source list (BIP44 + BIP32 + every DashPay contact-receiving | ||
| /// account) and its shortfall describes that whole permitted union, while | ||
| /// a whole-account *drain* build names exactly one account. CoinJoin funds | ||
| /// only through the drain form. |
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🟡 Suggestion: Distinguish drain recovery from exact-amount recovery
errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds is produced by both exact-amount funding and the CoinJoin whole-account drain. The current guidance tells every caller to confirm a smaller amount, but the drain API deliberately accepts no amount and consumes the selected account's entire spendable balance. This gives drain callers an impossible recovery action. State that exact-amount funding can refresh preflight and retry with a smaller amount, while a drain must refresh or sync the selected account, or replenish it, before retrying. Apply the same distinction to the PlatformWalletError.assetLockInsufficientFunds documentation at lines 347-353 and the FFI mapping documentation in packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs at lines 629-632.
source: ['codex', 'coderabbit']
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Good catch, and it applies to more than this one site. Fixed in c3e15a8.
You're right that code 29 is reachable from both funding forms while the guidance only fit one: the drain entry point takes no amount argument, so "confirm a smaller amount" is not an action a host can perform there. Both paths do share the mapper — map_asset_lock_funding_result is called from shielded_send.rs:1133 (FromWalletBalance { amount_duffs }) and :1393 (the CoinJoin drain) — so the wording had to split by form rather than just be softened.
All three sites that carried the amount-reduction advice are corrected, each keeping its existing format: the verbose errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds (29) block gains a per-form recovery list, the compact assetLockInsufficientFunds case prose gains the same split inline, and the map_asset_lock_funding_result doc in shielded_send.rs now records that both forms land on this one code. Recovery now reads: exact-amount → re-run preflight and confirm a smaller amount; drain → the account's drainable balance is under the minimum lock floor, so add funds or lower the floor.
Documentation only — no behavior, ABI, or signature change.
| let required = match amount { | ||
| AssetLockBuildAmount::Exact(value) => value, | ||
| AssetLockBuildAmount::DrainAll { minimum_lock_duffs } => { | ||
| minimum_lock_duffs.unwrap_or(0) | ||
| } | ||
| }; | ||
| map_builder_error(e, required) |
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🟡 Suggestion: Exercise the drain floor through the asset-lock builder
The new regression test calls map_builder_error directly with 12_345, so it verifies only that SelectionError::NoUtxosAvailable preserves the supplied fallback. It never exercises the new AssetLockBuildAmount::DrainAll branch that substitutes minimum_lock_duffs for the builder's zero-valued output placeholder. Reverting this branch to map_builder_error(e, amount_duffs) would restore the original available: 0, required: 0 drain result while the test continued to pass. Add an async build-level test with an empty or fully reserved CoinJoin account and DrainAll { minimum_lock_duffs: Some(12_345) }, then assert AssetLockInsufficientFunds { available: 0, required: 12_345 }.
source: ['codex']
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Confirmed and fixed in 1bb816d — the test was passing its own requested value into map_builder_error, so it could never observe the DrainAll arm that computes that value.
Added drain_shortfall_reports_the_minimum_lock_floor_as_required, an async build-level test on the existing CoinJoin fixture harness. It reserves the account's single UTXO with a first drain build and holds the reservation token for the rest of the test, leaving zero spendable candidates; a second DrainAll { minimum_lock_duffs: Some(12_345) } then has to come back as AssetLockInsufficientFunds { available: 0, required: 12_345 }. It also asserts the broadcaster was never reached.
I verified it actually guards the branch rather than assuming it does. Replacing the arm with the built amount_duffs (the zero placeholder on the drain path) fails the new test with left: 0, right: 12345, while coin_selection_shortfalls_map_to_typed_insufficient_funds still passes under that same mutation — exactly the silent revert you described.
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib wallet::asset_lock::build:: → 15 passed. cargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi --features shielded → 321 passed. fmt clean.
…ing form Code 29 is raised by BOTH asset-lock funding forms, but every doc site told the host to "confirm a smaller amount". That is only actionable for the exact-amount build: the whole-account CoinJoin drain (`shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` drain entry point) takes no amount argument at all, so there is nothing for a host to lower. A drain shortfall means the account's drainable balance is under the required minimum lock floor, and the only remedies are to add funds to that account or lower the floor. Corrects all three sites that carried the amount-reduction advice, each in its own existing format: - swift-sdk PlatformWalletResult.swift, `errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds` (29): the verbose result-code block gains a per-form recovery list. - swift-sdk PlatformWalletResult.swift, `assetLockInsufficientFunds`: the compact error-case prose gains the same split inline. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi shielded_send.rs, `map_asset_lock_funding_result`: the mapper doc now records that both funding forms land on this one code and how recovery differs. Documentation only — no behavior, no ABI, no signature changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The existing regression only called `map_builder_error` directly, passing
`12_345` in as the `requested` argument. That exercises the mapper but
never the new `AssetLockBuildAmount::DrainAll` arm in
`build_asset_lock_transaction_with_funding` that computes `requested` in
the first place — so reverting that arm left the suite green.
Adds an async build-level test over the CoinJoin fixture: the account's
single UTXO is reserved by a first drain build whose reservation token is
held for the rest of the test, leaving zero spendable candidates, and a
second `DrainAll { minimum_lock_duffs: Some(12_345) }` must come back as
`AssetLockInsufficientFunds { available: 0, required: 12_345 }`. Also
asserts the broadcaster was never reached.
Mutation-checked: replacing the branch with the built `amount_duffs` (a
zero placeholder on the drain path) fails this test with `left: 0,
right: 12345`, while the pre-existing direct-call test still passes —
which is exactly the gap that was reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Supersedes #4349 — same change, recreated on a
dashpay/platformbranch per repo policy (no more personal-fork PRs). Commits and authorship unchanged; full review history on #4349.The two Android-facing pieces #4327 left out. Both are small and independent of each other; they meet at one user action.
1. Kotlin/JNI binding for CoinJoin-drain shielded funding
#4327 landed the FFI export
platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock_coinjoin_drainand a Swift wrapper, but no Kotlin/JNI — so Android currently cannot call CoinJoin-funded shielding at all.This adds the JNI export in
rs-unified-sdk-jniand the Kotlin surface (FundingNative.shieldedFundFromCoinJoinDrain,PlatformWalletManager.shieldedFundFromCoinJoinDrain), shaped like the existingshieldedFundFromAssetLockbinding and following the Swift wrapper's contract:Σ inputs − L1 fee, computed Rust-side, so the mixed coins never hop through a transparent BIP44 address;The negative-index guard matches the sibling binding's boundary check (a negative
jintwould otherwise bit-cast to a hugeu32).The mixed-funds migration in the Android wallet depends on this binding — it is the CoinJoin → Shielded path.
2. Typed asset-lock shortfall at its reserved code 29
The FFI error registry has reserved 29 for
ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFundssince #4184, and the Swift and Kotlin mirrors already document the number — but the code was never allocated, because #4184 and its successor #4316 were both closed unmerged. That also left the producingPlatformWalletError::AssetLockInsufficientFundsvariant absent, so there was nothing to map from.This salvages the minimum needed to make the reserved code real (#4073):
AssetLockInsufficientFunds { available, required }variant;InsufficientFundsshapes keep their own exact amounts;NoUtxosAvailable— the most extreme shortfall — previously fell through to the generic string form while partial shortfalls stayed typed, and now maps toavailable: 0against the requested target. Every other builder error keeps its existing generic string;Fromarm, and tests pinning both the mapping and the number.Without the
Fromarm a shortfall flattens toErrorUnknown(99), forcing hosts to substring-match the Display text. The amounts still ride the message —PlatformWalletFFIResultis ABI-frozen to code + message — but hosts can now branch on the code.Two existing asset-lock tests asserted the old generic error for a "fails at input selection" rebuild; they now assert the typed shortfall with
available: 0, which is a stronger statement of the same intent.Why these two are in one PR
Draining an empty CoinJoin account is a coin-selection shortfall. The binding is how Android runs the migration; code 29 is how it explains the most likely failure without parsing English.
Testing
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib— 611 passedcargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi— 263 + 26 + 6 passedcargo clippy -p platform-wallet -p platform-wallet-ffi -p rs-unified-sdk-jni --all-targets -- -D warnings— cleancargo fmt --check— clean./gradlew :sdk:assembleDebug :sdk:testDebugUnitTest— BUILD SUCCESSFULThe Halo 2 proving path itself is unchanged and untested here; this PR only adds the call surface to it.
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