fix(net): reject response errors in QGETDATA requests - #7605
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WalkthroughQGETDATA processing now checks payload size before deserialization and assigns a 100-point misbehavior score to oversized payloads. The functional message supports an optional requester-supplied error byte without changing the default wire format. A functional test verifies disconnection for requester-supplied error values. Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Mergeability Score: ⚪ Minimal · up to The PR rejects malformed QGETDATA requests containing response-only error data and adds functional coverage for peer disconnection; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains. Possibly related PRs
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In `@test/functional/p2p_quorum_data.py`:
- Around line 379-391: Add fresh-peer test cases alongside
test_qgetdata_rejects_requester_error for QGETDATA messages with error=0 and
error=0xFF, using the same setup, send, disconnect assertion, and cleanup;
verify both explicitly decoded special values disconnect the peer.
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src/llmq/net_quorum.cpptest/functional/p2p_quorum_data.pytest/functional/test_framework/messages.py
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The fixed-size payload gate correctly rejects every response-only or trailing byte before deserialization and applies the intended misbehavior score. The functional test covers the original nonzero-error exploit, but it does not verify the presence-based behavior promised for the two special decoded values.
Source: reviewer backend model: gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend model: gpt-5.6-sol. Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol (not reviewer evidence).
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `test/functional/p2p_quorum_data.py`:
- [SUGGESTION] test/functional/p2p_quorum_data.py:383-390: Exercise presence-based rejection for both special error bytes
The PR explicitly requires rejection based on field presence, including serialized `NONE` (`0x00`) and `UNDEFINED` (`0xFF`), but the test sends only `ENCRYPTED_CONTRIBUTIONS_MISSING`. It would therefore pass with a weaker value-based check that rejects ordinary nonzero errors while accepting one or both special values. Exercise both boundary values on fresh peers, while retaining the existing nonzero case, so the regression test distinguishes the size-based implementation from every decoded-value gate.
| p2p_mn = p2p_connection(mn2.get_node(self)) | ||
| id_p2p_mn = get_p2p_id(mn2.get_node(self)) | ||
| mnauth(mn2.get_node(self), id_p2p_mn, fake_mnauth_2[0], fake_mnauth_2[1]) | ||
| wait_for_banscore(mn2.get_node(self), id_p2p_mn, 0) | ||
| poisoned = msg_qgetdata(quorum_hash_int, 100, 0x01, error=ENCRYPTED_CONTRIBUTIONS_MISSING) | ||
| p2p_mn.send_message(poisoned) | ||
| self.wait_until(lambda: not p2p_mn.is_connected, timeout=10) | ||
| mn2.get_node(self).disconnect_p2ps() |
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🟡 Suggestion: Exercise presence-based rejection for both special error bytes
The PR explicitly requires rejection based on field presence, including serialized NONE (0x00) and UNDEFINED (0xFF), but the test sends only ENCRYPTED_CONTRIBUTIONS_MISSING. It would therefore pass with a weaker value-based check that rejects ordinary nonzero errors while accepting one or both special values. Exercise both boundary values on fresh peers, while retaining the existing nonzero case, so the regression test distinguishes the size-based implementation from every decoded-value gate.
| p2p_mn = p2p_connection(mn2.get_node(self)) | |
| id_p2p_mn = get_p2p_id(mn2.get_node(self)) | |
| mnauth(mn2.get_node(self), id_p2p_mn, fake_mnauth_2[0], fake_mnauth_2[1]) | |
| wait_for_banscore(mn2.get_node(self), id_p2p_mn, 0) | |
| poisoned = msg_qgetdata(quorum_hash_int, 100, 0x01, error=ENCRYPTED_CONTRIBUTIONS_MISSING) | |
| p2p_mn.send_message(poisoned) | |
| self.wait_until(lambda: not p2p_mn.is_connected, timeout=10) | |
| mn2.get_node(self).disconnect_p2ps() | |
| for error in (0, 0xFF, ENCRYPTED_CONTRIBUTIONS_MISSING): | |
| p2p_mn = p2p_connection(mn2.get_node(self)) | |
| id_p2p_mn = get_p2p_id(mn2.get_node(self)) | |
| mnauth(mn2.get_node(self), id_p2p_mn, fake_mnauth_2[0], fake_mnauth_2[1]) | |
| wait_for_banscore(mn2.get_node(self), id_p2p_mn, 0) | |
| poisoned = msg_qgetdata(quorum_hash_int, 100, 0x01, error=error) | |
| p2p_mn.send_message(poisoned) | |
| self.wait_until(lambda: not p2p_mn.is_connected, timeout=10) | |
| mn2.get_node(self).disconnect_p2ps() |
source: ['codex', 'coderabbit']
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Resolved in 1a32e0e — Exercise presence-based rejection for both special error bytes no longer present.
Auto-resolved by the review system based on the latest commit diff. If you believe this was closed in error, reopen the thread.
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Final validation — Codex/Sol only (Phase 2 disabled)
The fixed-size QGETDATA payload check rejects response-only error fields and arbitrary trailing bytes before deserialization. The current functional test exercises the ordinary missing-data error plus explicit NONE (0x00) and UNDEFINED (0xFF) values on fresh connections, so the prior coverage finding is fixed and no in-scope issues remain.
Source: reviewer backend model: gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier backend model: gpt-5.6-sol. Orchestration-only: openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol (not reviewer evidence).
Validated zero-blocker Codex/Sol precheck evidence was promoted to final because Phase 2 (Sonnet/Opus) is temporarily disabled. This is Codex/Sol-only final validation, not Codex + Sonnet/Opus coverage.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet/Opus: not run (Phase 2 disabled — temporary Codex/Sol-only final)
- Secondary pass: disabled (
temporary_phase2_sonnet_disable)
0ec62ed fix(llmq): bound QGETDATA request tracking (pasta) Pull request description: ## Issue being fixed or feature implemented Inbound QGETDATA registration happened before validation, and each fresh `quorumHash` produced a distinct map key. Entries remained for the expiry window while cleanup depended on block-tip callbacks that are skipped during IBD and while unsynced, allowing an MNAuth peer or unauthenticated qwatch peer to grow request tracking without a hard bound. This PR is now the request-tracking half of the original combined change. Requester-supplied response-error validation was split into #7605 so the two defects can be reviewed and merged independently. ## What was done? - Prevalidate the LLMQ type and active-chain block before tracking: - unregistered LLMQ types return `QUORUM_TYPE_INVALID`, score 100, and are not tracked; - unknown or off-active-chain blocks return `QUORUM_BLOCK_NOT_FOUND` unscored and are not tracked; - active-chain blocks are registered before the commitment lookup so repeated uncached misses are rate-limited. - Bound attacker-controlled inbound tracking to 64 live entries per requester and 4096 globally. Outbound requests initiated by this node do not consume those budgets. - Score authenticated requesters that exhaust their own budget by 25. Shared/global exhaustion is not scored because the arriving peer is not necessarily responsible. - Run expired-request cleanup every minute independently of block-tip progress, while retaining tip-triggered cleanup. Unauthenticated qwatch peers continue to share the null identity used by the existing per-key limiter. Exhaustion of that shared 64-entry budget is therefore unscored; the independent 4096-entry global cap remains the hard memory bound. ## How Has This Been Tested? - Full local `make -j13` build on macOS arm64 using the prebuilt depends tree. - `./src/test/test_dash --run_test=llmq_qgetdata_tests` - `./src/test/test_dash --run_test='llmq_*'` (75 cases) - `/opt/homebrew/bin/python3.9 test/functional/test_runner.py p2p_quorum_data.py` - `test/lint/all-lint.py` - `git diff --check` The Python lint subcheck skipped because `flake8` is not installed; the remaining lint checks passed. ## Breaking Changes None. ## Checklist: - [x] I have performed a self-review of my own code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [x] I have added or updated relevant unit/integration/functional/e2e tests - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [ ] I have assigned this pull request to a milestone This pull request was created by Codex. Top commit has no ACKs. Tree-SHA512: e6bf07f0ff9b0c161e6d0cf5700a97055849431e2712b2410edb517ac39b1340d41e940b00c8ee5174e9bdbdbc521e3ab3f0e2048c2a210068c3264836dcb9ae
3 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
CQuorumDataRequestreads an optional trailingnErrorbyte for QDATA responses, but the QGETDATA request handler also accepted that response-only field. A requester could select one of the missing-data errors that intentionally suppress repeated-request scoring while still forcing response work.This is the protocol-validation half split out of #7519 so it can be reviewed and merged independently from request-tracking bounds.
What was done?
NONE,UNDEFINED, and trailing bytes are rejected too.How Has This Been Tested?
make -j13build on macOS arm64 using the prebuilt depends tree./opt/homebrew/bin/python3.9 test/functional/test_runner.py p2p_quorum_data.pygit diff --checktest/lint/lint-python.pywas invoked but skipped becauseflake8is not installed in the local environment.Breaking Changes
None.
nErroron an inbound QGETDATA request was never meaningful.Checklist:
This pull request was created by Codex.