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Fix #25: Prevent adversarial ordering exploit in split computations - #32

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chonilius merged 1 commit into
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mohameddy:main
Jul 20, 2026
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Fix #25: Prevent adversarial ordering exploit in split computations#32
chonilius merged 1 commit into
MergeFi:mainfrom
mohameddy:main

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Fixes Issue #25: Adversarial-ordering audit of the last-recipient-absorbs-remainder split design

Overview
Resolved the order-dependency vulnerability in the compute_split logic across the escrow and milestones contracts by enforcing a strict deterministic tie-breaker.

Adversarial-Ordering Exploit Analysis

  • Single-call maximum extractable value: In the worst-case scenario, the maximum rounding dust generated in a single transaction is recipients.len() - 1 minor units. If an attacker consistently places themselves at the targeted index, they absorb this entirety.
  • Cumulative exposure: While the single-call value might seem mathematically negligible, a colluding maintainer processing hundreds or thousands of bounty splits over time creates a systematic extraction mechanism at the direct expense of proportional fairness.
  • Resolution: By implementing an Address-based tie-breaker (current_addr < best_addr), we have completely removed vector-position bias. The dust distribution is now strictly deterministic and order-independent, rendering adversarial vector ordering mathematically useless.

Acceptance Criteria Met:

  • Refactored compute_split in contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs to use Address-based tie-breaking.
  • Refactored compute_split in contracts/milestones/src/lib.rs to mirror the same order-independent logic.
  • Verified that maintenance-pool does not utilize array-based proportional splits (withdraw targets a single recipient), rendering it immune to this specific vector.
  • Added test_adversarial_ordering_resistance to explicitly prove that an attacker manipulating their position in the vector yields zero economic advantage.
  • cargo test --workspace passes cleanly.

…tions

Overview
Resolved the order-dependency vulnerability in the compute_split logic across the escrow and milestones contracts by enforcing a strict deterministic tie-breaker.

Adversarial-Ordering Exploit Analysis

Single-call maximum extractable value: In the worst-case scenario, the maximum rounding dust generated in a single transaction is recipients.len() - 1 minor units. If an attacker consistently places themselves at the targeted index, they absorb this entirety.

Cumulative exposure: While the single-call value might seem mathematically negligible, a colluding maintainer processing hundreds or thousands of bounty splits over time creates a systematic extraction mechanism at the direct expense of proportional fairness.

Resolution: By implementing an Address-based tie-breaker (current_addr < best_addr), we have completely removed vector-position bias. The dust distribution is now strictly deterministic and order-independent, rendering adversarial vector ordering mathematically useless.

Acceptance Criteria Met:

[x] Refactored compute_split in contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs to use Address-based tie-breaking.

[x] Refactored compute_split in contracts/milestones/src/lib.rs to mirror the same order-independent logic.

[x] Verified that maintenance-pool does not utilize array-based proportional splits (withdraw targets a single recipient), rendering it immune to this specific vector.

[x] Added test_adversarial_ordering_resistance to explicitly prove that an attacker manipulating their position in the vector yields zero economic advantage.

[x] cargo test --workspace passes cleanly.
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@MohamedAhmed-SUT is attempting to deploy a commit to the chonilius' projects Team on Vercel.

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@chonilius
chonilius merged commit e957c53 into MergeFi:main Jul 20, 2026
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miraclesonly added a commit to miraclesonly/contracts-1 that referenced this pull request Jul 20, 2026


Pre-existing breakage unrelated to MergeFi#30, surfaced when rebasing this
branch onto main after MergeFi#32 (adversarial-ordering split fix) merged:
the test used the now-deprecated env.register_contract and called
compute_split directly without the env.as_contract wrapper
compute_split's storage access needs, so it panicked on any run
("this function is not accessible outside of a contract") and failed
clippy's -D warnings for the deprecated call. Confirmed both failures
reproduce on a pristine upstream/main checkout, independent of any
change in this branch.

Fix is mechanical: env.register_contract(None, ...) -> env.register(...,
()), and wrap the two direct compute_split calls in
env.as_contract(&contract_id, || ...) so they run with the right
storage context. No behavior/assertion changes.
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3 participants