diff --git a/docker/testnet/Caddyfile b/docker/testnet/Caddyfile
index 2de211cd..0209e12c 100644
--- a/docker/testnet/Caddyfile
+++ b/docker/testnet/Caddyfile
@@ -3,10 +3,24 @@
 	order rate_limit before basic_auth
 }
 
+# Proxy to the node, stripping its CORS headers so only Caddy's single copy
+# survives (the node also emits CORS via --rpc-cors all; duplicates make the
+# browser reject the response with "multiple values '*, *'").
+(rpc_upstream) {
+	reverse_proxy localhost:9944 {
+		header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
+		header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
+		header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
+		header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
+		header_down -Vary
+	}
+}
+
 {$RPC_DOMAIN:rpc-1.testnet.orbinum.io} {
 	tls /etc/caddy/origin.pem /etc/caddy/origin.key
 
-	# Access log — needed to see who gets 429'd and with which client IP.
+	# Access log — who gets 429'd, with which client IP, and whether a 429 came
+	# from Caddy (Retry-After present) or the node ("Too many connections" body).
 	log {
 		output file /data/access.log {
 			roll_size 50mb
@@ -15,22 +29,10 @@
 		format json
 	}
 
-	# Rate-limit key: real client IP from Cloudflare; if the request did not come
-	# through CF the header is empty and every such client would share ONE bucket
-	# (mass 429s), so fall back to the direct peer IP.
-	map {header.CF-Connecting-IP} {rl_key} {
-		"" {remote_host}
-		default {header.CF-Connecting-IP}
-	}
-
 	# ── CORS — Caddy is the single source ───────────────────────────────────────
-	# The node also emits CORS (--rpc-cors all), so on proxied responses BOTH Caddy
-	# and the node would add Access-Control-Allow-Origin → the browser rejects the
-	# duplicate ("multiple values '*, *'"). Each reverse_proxy below strips the
-	# node's CORS headers (header_down -...) so only Caddy's remain. Setting them
-	# at the Caddy layer (not just the proxy) also covers Caddy-generated responses
-	# — the rate-limit 429 — which never reach the node; a 429 without CORS is what
-	# the browser turned into an opaque "CORS error" and broke the explorer.
+	# Set at the Caddy layer (not just the proxy) so Caddy-generated responses —
+	# the rate-limit 429 — carry CORS too; a 429 without CORS is what the browser
+	# turned into an opaque "CORS error" and broke the explorer.
 	header {
 		Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*"
 		Access-Control-Allow-Methods "GET, POST, OPTIONS"
@@ -47,40 +49,39 @@
 	# request. The limiter counts requests, so without this split each reconnect
 	# would burn a rate event and, under load, clients could not re-establish their
 	# subscription (the WSS-failed errors). Route upgrades straight to the node,
-	# unthrottled; total connections stay capped by --rpc-max-connections (1000).
+	# unthrottled; total connections stay capped by --rpc-max-connections (5000).
 	@websocket header Connection *Upgrade*
 	handle @websocket {
-		reverse_proxy localhost:9944 {
-			# Strip the node's CORS so only Caddy's single copy survives.
-			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
-			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
-			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
-			header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
-			header_down -Vary
+		import rpc_upstream
+	}
+
+	# HTTP JSON-RPC (POST): per-IP rate limit, 500 events / 10s = 50 req/s per
+	# IP — headroom for explorers/wallets/light bots that burst, while still
+	# capping an abusive IP. Two zones by traffic source: Cloudflare-proxied
+	# requests are keyed on the real client IP CF forwards (the direct peer is
+	# always a CF edge, {remote_host} would limit everyone as one bucket), and
+	# direct-origin requests are keyed on their peer IP in a separate zone —
+	# a missing header can never collapse everyone into one shared bucket.
+	@viaCf header CF-Connecting-IP *
+	handle @viaCf {
+		rate_limit {
+			zone rpc_cf {
+				key {http.request.header.CF-Connecting-IP}
+				events 500
+				window 10s
+			}
 		}
+		import rpc_upstream
 	}
 
-	# HTTP JSON-RPC (POST): per-IP rate limit, keyed on the real client IP that
-	# Cloudflare forwards (the direct peer is always Cloudflare, so {remote_host}
-	# would limit everyone as one). 500 events / 10s = 50 req/s per IP — headroom
-	# for explorers/wallets/light bots that burst, while still capping an abusive
-	# IP. The previous 100/10s (10 req/s) was low enough that one indexer load test
-	# 429'd real users.
 	handle {
 		rate_limit {
-			zone rpc {
-				key {rl_key}
+			zone rpc_direct {
+				key {remote_host}
 				events 500
 				window 10s
 			}
 		}
-		reverse_proxy localhost:9944 {
-			# Strip the node's CORS so only Caddy's single copy survives.
-			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
-			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
-			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
-			header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
-			header_down -Vary
-		}
+		import rpc_upstream
 	}
 }