diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
index f7cad91..7177a68 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
@@ -46,6 +46,13 @@ jobs:
           # security-and-quality is broader than the default security-extended;
           # these are small libraries, so the extra findings are affordable.
           queries: security-and-quality
+          # Analyse source only. obj/ and bin/ hold generated and compiled
+          # output — e.g. the xUnit auto-generated entry point — so findings
+          # there are noise against code no human maintains.
+          config: |
+            paths-ignore:
+              - "**/obj/**"
+              - "**/bin/**"
 
       # Explicit build rather than autobuild: these repos multi-target, and
       # autobuild has picked a single TFM in the past, silently analysing half
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 59594a3..9636530 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 - **`SECURITY.md`**, with a scope section specific to this library: SHA-256 verification establishes integrity but not authenticity (the expected hash ships from the same release as the asset, and there is no signature checking); `AllowInsecureManifestSource` and `UseDefaultSha256Verifier = false` are documented opt-outs that defeat verification by design; archive path-traversal defence is the framework's `ZipFile`/`TarFile` guard rather than this library's; and `GhCliReleaseSource` trusts whatever `gh` is on `PATH`. Stating the boundary is the point — a report that only restates a documented limitation is not a vulnerability.
 - **`CONTRIBUTING.md`, `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md` and `CLAUDE.md`.** `CLAUDE.md` records the constraints an agent would otherwise violate here — why the three-platform matrix is load-bearing, why one install-lock test returns early on Windows by design, and that `PackageValidationBaselineVersion` tracks the last shipped release.
-- **CodeQL code scanning** (`codeql.yml`), weekly plus on every push and PR, with the `security-and-quality` query pack. The build is explicit rather than `autobuild`, which has been observed to pick a single TFM and silently analyse half a multi-targeted codebase.
+- **CodeQL code scanning** (`codeql.yml`), weekly plus on every push and PR, with the `security-and-quality` query pack. The build is explicit rather than `autobuild`, which has been observed to pick a single TFM and silently analyse half a multi-targeted codebase. Analysis excludes `**/obj/**` and `**/bin/**`, so generated and compiled output — the xUnit auto-generated entry point among it — raises no findings.
 - **Dependabot auto-merge for minor and patch bumps** (`dependabot-auto-merge.yml`), queued behind the `ci` gate. Majors are never auto-merged. Approval uses an `AUTO_MERGE_PAT` Dependabot secret owned by a code owner — an Actions secret of the same name resolves to an empty string in a Dependabot-triggered workflow, and a `GITHUB_TOKEN` approval cannot satisfy a code-owner review.
 
 None of the above changes the library, its public surface, or the package contents.