diff --git a/crates/openshell-sandbox/data/sandbox-policy.rego b/crates/openshell-sandbox/data/sandbox-policy.rego
index 0fa1e6be7..82b8de5f5 100644
--- a/crates/openshell-sandbox/data/sandbox-policy.rego
+++ b/crates/openshell-sandbox/data/sandbox-policy.rego
@@ -34,12 +34,16 @@ deny_reason := reason if {
 	input.network
 	input.exec
 	not network_policy_for_request
-	endpoint_misses := [r |
-		some name
-		policy := data.network_policies[name]
-		not endpoint_allowed(policy, input.network)
-		r := sprintf("endpoint %s:%d not in policy '%s'", [input.network.host, input.network.port, name])
-	]
+	not endpoint_policy_for_request
+	count(data.network_policies) > 0
+	reason := sprintf("endpoint %s:%d is not allowed by any policy", [input.network.host, input.network.port])
+}
+
+deny_reason := reason if {
+	input.network
+	input.exec
+	not network_policy_for_request
+	endpoint_policy_for_request
 	ancestors_str := concat(" -> ", input.exec.ancestors)
 	cmdline_str := concat(", ", input.exec.cmdline_paths)
 	binary_misses := [r |
@@ -49,9 +53,8 @@ deny_reason := reason if {
 		not binary_allowed(policy, input.exec)
 		r := sprintf("binary '%s' not allowed in policy '%s' (ancestors: [%s], cmdline: [%s]). SYMLINK HINT: the binary path is the kernel-resolved target from /proc/<pid>/exe, not the symlink. If your policy specifies a symlink (e.g., /usr/bin/python3) but the actual binary is /usr/bin/python3.11, either: (1) use the canonical path in your policy (run 'readlink -f /usr/bin/python3' inside the sandbox), or (2) ensure symlink resolution is working (check sandbox logs for 'Cannot access container filesystem')", [input.exec.path, name, ancestors_str, cmdline_str])
 	]
-	all_reasons := array.concat(endpoint_misses, binary_misses)
-	count(all_reasons) > 0
-	reason := concat("; ", all_reasons)
+	count(binary_misses) > 0
+	reason := concat("; ", binary_misses)
 }
 
 deny_reason := "network connections not allowed by policy" if {
@@ -91,6 +94,12 @@ network_policy_for_request if {
 	binary_allowed(data.network_policies[name], input.exec)
 }
 
+endpoint_policy_for_request if {
+	some name
+	data.network_policies[name]
+	endpoint_allowed(data.network_policies[name], input.network)
+}
+
 # Endpoint matching: exact host (case-insensitive) + port in ports list.
 endpoint_allowed(policy, network) if {
 	some endpoint
diff --git a/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/opa.rs b/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/opa.rs
index b49875b78..0acbbe93d 100644
--- a/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/opa.rs
+++ b/crates/openshell-sandbox/src/opa.rs
@@ -4585,6 +4585,25 @@ network_policies:
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn deny_reason_collapses_endpoint_misses() {
+        let engine = test_engine();
+        let input = NetworkInput {
+            host: "not-configured.example.com".into(),
+            port: 443,
+            binary_path: PathBuf::from("/usr/local/bin/claude"),
+            binary_sha256: "unused".into(),
+            ancestors: vec![],
+            cmdline_paths: vec![],
+        };
+        let decision = engine.evaluate_network(&input).unwrap();
+        assert!(!decision.allowed);
+        assert_eq!(
+            decision.reason,
+            "endpoint not-configured.example.com:443 is not allowed by any policy"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// Check if symlink resolution through `/proc/<pid>/root/` actually works.
     /// Creates a real symlink in a tempdir and attempts to resolve it via
     /// the procfs root path. This catches environments where the probe path